Know Thyself, Know Thy Technologies.

Know Thyself, Know Thy Technologies.

Could this statement be the philosophical mantra of our generation? Philosopher and cognitive scientist Andy Clark believes it should be and hopes to convince the rest of the world that the technologies we use are actually an integrated part of our cognitive process.

One of the most forceful and perhaps shocking arguments of Natural-Born Cyborgs, the extended mind theory, is the claim that the mind is not bounded by the biological organism but extends into the environment of that organism. This theory stems from the understanding that “what makes us distinctively human is our capacity to continually restructure and rebuild our own mental circuitry, courtesy of an empowering web of culture, education, technology, and artifacts”  (10). To Clark the classic mind-body problem is really the “mind-body-scaffolding problem,” meaning it is the problem of understanding how human thought and reason comes from the interactions between material brains, material bodies, and our cultural and technological environments. The brain is not a privileged organ and there is no “single self.” Human individuals are just shifting coalitions of tools (134-137).

Clark’s arguments are effective and in many cases believable, however one cannot expect to edit a fundamental philosophical argument without some opposition. A few weeks ago, Professor Bharath Vallabha from the Bryn Mawr philosophy department gave a talk in opposition to Clark’s claim that the mind is a coalition of our brains, bodies, and the technologies that surround us. Instead he argues for “embodied cognition,” the theory that beliefs are neither in the head nor outside the body; they are the modes of activity of a person. Our beliefs are not in the forms of technology that we use, rather “technology makes possible the forms of action constitutive of being a thinker.”

Both concerns and new insight arise from these two suppositions. In the following, I will explore a few of the problems that arise from each of these theories.

Professor Vallabha claims that actions determine our beliefs, leading to a commonly known conundrum: the chicken or the egg question, in this case the belief or action question. Which came first the action or the belief? There obviously are all sorts of actions that we perform without belief behind them, but are there not just as many actions that we perform solely based on beliefs? The Embodied Cognition theory implores us to believe that the mind is not anywhere; but if our beliefs are only to be found in our actions, where are they stored once that action is complete? When I was twelve years-old, I tried competitive running for the first time. From this action I acquired the belief that I enjoy competitive running. That belief was then stored somewhere and has been reaffirmed when I go running. It was not forgotten and then remembered each time I take this action. If I could not retain the knowledge that I enjoy running, how would I have known to particpate in that activity again? While Vallabha’s embodied cognition presents an intriguing theory behind our acquisition of belief and knowledge, it fails to account for how those beliefs are stored once acquired.

An interesting similarity between these two theories occurs when, in Natural-Born Cyborgs, Clark appears to accept part of Vallabha’s embodied cognition into his more encompassing extended mind theory. “I think of myself not just as a physical presence but as a kind of rational or intellectual presence. I think of myself in terms of a certain set of ongoing goals, projects, and commitments: to write a new paper, to be a good husband . . . I recognize myself, over my lifetime, in part by keeping track of this flow of projects and commitments” (132) From this section in Cyborgs, one can infer that Clark would find no issue with Vallabha’s theory, as it is already a part of his own.

Although I greatly appreciate Clark’s “mind-body-scaffolding problem,” I am naturally desposed to look for a way to oppose the idea that our minds could be located outside of the “biological skin-bag.” This is mostly due to my unwillingness to let go of my individual self. After reviewing both of these intriguing theories, it is my belief that they are not necessarily disparate. In fact, by combining part of embodied cognition with pieces of the extended mind hypothesis, I feel that the majority of my qualms would become null and void.

Both men recognize the importance of the outside world in our cognitive process. It is undeniable that our technologies and cultures have shaped and continue to shape the way in which we think and the beliefs that result from our thinking. Clark is correct in assuming that these outside forces hold beliefs, however the knowledge held there necessarily must have come from somewhere. Technologies outside of the “biological skin-bag” serve to hold an individual’s beliefs and it is true that these beliefs may then be found and adopted by others. One can mold technology to be an exact copy of the mind, but it will never actually be one’s mind. We grow relient on technologies like cell phones and computers, not because they are our mind, but because they house an archive of how and what we think while making once difficult tasks easier.

The individual self that is me, made up of all my past actions, decisions, and thoughts, can exist without the technologies that it has grown so accustomed to. As long as I don’t suffer permanant brain damage or do not have my mind erased by the CIA, I will remember who I am and will continue to change as I live throughout my life. The loss of technology does not mean the loss of cognition.

Ultimately even with my opposition to pieces of both embodied cognition and the extended mind theory, Clark’s mantra for the 21st century still rings true. Our technologies do produce who and what we are. The human “privileged user” will continue to change based on the scaffolding provided in one’s environment. Maybe one day it will be possible for human minds to remotely access external harddrive s and computers, proving Andy Clark entirely correct in his extended mind theory. Until then, we’ll just have to stick to good-old-fashioned internet browsers and migraine inducing computer screens.